CNN-Money has a cool interactive map showing economic indicators for the 50 states. It demonstrates some of the points I have made in earlier posts about the recessionary effects not being felt equally across the country.

Some selected excerpts from the Time Magazine Cover Story “Why We’re So Gloomy”:

“I haven’t really been able to sort out exactly why there has been this degree of pessimism.”
~Former President Bush

Well, why are Americans so gloomy, fearful and even panicked about the current economic slump?

In one of history’s most painful paradoxes, U.S. consumers seem suddenly disillusioned with the American Dream of rising prosperity even as capitalism and democracy have consigned the Soviet Union to history’s trash heap. Hard times are forcing some people to turn their back on the American Dream.

“Whining” hardly captures the extent of the gloom Americans feel as the current downturn enters its 14th month. The slump is the longest, if not the deepest, since the Great Depression. Traumatized by layoffs that have cost more than 1.2 million jobs during the slump, U.S. consumers have fallen into their deepest funk in years.

While some economists have described the current slump as a near depression, that phrase overstates the case if it is taken as a comparison with the period 1929-33, when the U.S. economy contracted by nearly a third. The D word becomes more valid, especially with a small d, when it is used to compare the growth rate of the 1930s, which averaged 0.5% a year, with the expected sluggishness of the next decade, which some economists predict will see an average growth rate of 2%.

“I’m worried if my kids can earn a decent living and buy a house,” says Tony Lentini, vice president of public affairs for Mitchell Energy in Houston. “I wonder if this will be the first generation that didn’t do better than their parents. There’s a genuine feeling that the country has gotten way off track, and neither political party has any answers. Americans don’t see any solutions.”

The deeper tremors emanate from the kind of change that occurs only once every few decades. America is going through a historic transition from a heedless borrow-and-spend society to one that stresses savings and investment. When this recession is over, America will not simply go back to business as usual.

The underlying change in the way American consumers and business leaders think about saving and spending will make the recovery one of the slowest in history and the next decade one of lowered expectations. Many economists agree that the U.S. will face at least several years of very modest growth as consumers and companies work off the vast debt they assumed in the last decade.

The conditions that led to today’s transition economy go back several decades. Americans have suffered a long-term stagnation of their earnings. The median income of U.S. families has virtually stood still since 1973, showing an annual gain of just 0.3% a year.

The recent debt binge took place on a colossal scale in every sector of the economy. Runaway federal deficits have more than tripled the national debt. Meanwhile, consumers increased their IOUs from $1.4 trillion to $3.7 trillion last year. And U.S. industry raised its debt from $1.4 trillion to $3.5 trillion over the same period. The reckless borrowing made a reckoning inevitable.

So far, though, no reprieve from layoffs is anywhere in sight. Economists say U.S. companies will shed more than 1 million jobs in fields ranging from banking to aerospace, a pace even faster than last year’s. “It’s become almost like a poker game to see who can cut the most,” says employment analyst Lacey. “There’s a kind of corporate frenzy.”

GM’s plans to close 25 plants and cut 74,000 jobs, or 19% of its work force, scarcely addresses such problems as why it takes the company up to a year longer than the Japanese to redesign its cars.

This was from the January 13, 1992 edition of Time Magazine, and the opening quote was from President George H.W. Bush, and the article was about the relatively mild 1990-1991 recession. Note: The text above was altered slightly so that the specific time period was not obvious. Notice the distinct similarities to the reporting about today’s economy.

The July 1990 to March 1991 recession was one of the shortest in U.S. history (8 months according to the NBER) and relatively mild: the jobless rate averaged only 6.1% during the recession and reached a high of only 6.8% by the end of the recession (although it continued to rise after the recession ended, see chart above). I think there is a general consensus that the 1990-1991 was nowhere near as severe as the three previous recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, and it’s a fact that the 1973-1975 and 1981-1982 recessions were twice as long (16 months) as the 1990-1991 recession. And yet, to continue making the point, here is what the media were reporting about the 1990-1991 recession:

“In 1991 the average American expressed more pessimism about the future than at any time since the Great Depression.”

“There is no question but this is the worst economic time since the Great Depression.”

“Sluggish economic growth this year will cap the worst three-year period centered on a recession since the Great Depression.”

“Forecasts for a weak recovery in 1992 suggest the period since 1990 will be the worst for the economy since the Great Depression.”

“…..the worst plunge since the Great Depression.”

“The banking industry has plunged to its lowest point since the Great Depression.”

“This is the most severe economic dislocation we’ve had since the 1930s. Few are immune.”

“Mr. Barry, a past president of the Chamber of Commerce, said 50 For Sale signs are just the tip of the iceberg, since many bank foreclosures and repossessions do not carry signs. “It’s not a recession, it’s a depression,” he said.”

“….with the US economy locked in a recession and more people out of work since the Great Depression.”

“….the worst (retail) sales period on record since the Great Depression.”

“This recession is hitting white-collar workers more heavily than any since the Great Depression of the 1930s.”

Again, sound familiar? Links available here.
HT: Alex Tabarrok at Marginal Revolution and Mark Perry at Ca
rpe Diem.

Much attention has been placed in the media regarding President-elect Obama’s stimulus plan. The question of debate basically comes down to whether or not it is needed and, if so, what form of stimulus will work best?

Three criteria are crucial for evaluating fiscal stimulus packages. First, does the program target the weakness in the economy that caused the recession, or is it largely peripheral? Second, are the funds going to be spent in a timely fashion? Third, does the program fundamentally strengthen the economy going forward into the expansion phase? A look at the economy’s current circumstances suggests that a large fiscal stimulus is needed, but a badly designed one will, in the words of an old song, merely leave America “another day older and deeper in debt.”

The cause of the current recession is buried in the balance sheet of the private sector, particularly the financial sector and the household sector. The government and the Federal Reserve have begun a number of programs to fix the balance sheet of the financial sector, some more effective than others.

The main challenge facing the new administration and Congress is how to handle the inevitable efforts of Americans to fight the effects of the financial crisis by saving. It would be foolish to stop this adjustment with government policy both because any efforts to do so would fail and because the restoration of a healthier household balance sheet is essential to the long-term recovery of the economy. Instead, the government must focus on how to ameliorate the effects that the resulting reduction in household spending will have on the economy.

The household saving rate is likely to rise by roughly 7 percentage points, from roughly one-half of one percent of disposable income to between 7 and 8 percent. The majority of this adjustment is likely to occur well before the end of 2009, with some further modest increase thereafter. One estimate suggests a drop in consumer demand of roughly $500 billion in 2009 and a further drop of roughly half that figure in 2010. These frame the quantitative parameters for an appropriate fiscal stimulus.

The bulk of government spending programs that have been suggested involve transfers of federal resources to state and local governments. While any or all of these programs might qualify as meritorious in their own right, they collectively fail the tests of well targeted stimulus.

Note first that such spending programs do not directly address the household balance sheet problem. The history of such programs overwhelmingly suggests that states and localities will simply substitute federal funds for their own resources for the vast bulk of the money spent. As such, little net impact will be had on household balance sheets.

These programs also generally fail the test of timeliness. Consider the phrase “shovel ready” being used to describe many of these programs. By definition a shovel-ready project is one that state or local government has already spent a good deal of money developing and is likely to continue spending on. On the other hand, infrastructure projects that actually will produce net new spending are never shovel-ready. Most of the spending will end up occurring at the peak of the business cycle when it is not needed, not at the bottom.

By contrast, there are some ongoing federal spending programs that can be quickly ramped up during a recession. Most notable is defense procurement. There is wide agreement that we have run down our defense infrastructure substantially. Much of this can be remedied by simply increasing the pace of existing production programs. Think of it as “assembly line-ready” instead of shovel-ready. Defense spending also gets around the problem of federal dollars supplanting other spending, as only the federal government is involved.

The third test involves whether projects assist the economy in entering the expansion phase. In general, government spending programs divert resources from the private sector as it tries to expand. Some infrastructure projects genuinely assist the private sector by making it more efficient. One such project now being discussed is the creation of a national energy grid. This has been tried before, but failed to get through the legal roadblocks thrown in its path by environmental groups and private landowners. Thus, a project may be highly desirable, but not timely. It may be a good idea, but it is not stimulus.

The question to ask about any infrastructure project being sold as “stimulus” is why the project hasn’t been done already. The most common answer is that the state and local political process didn’t find that the benefits met the costs–a sure sign that the project is not likely to pay for itself during the expansion phase of the business cycle. Another test of the genuineness of the stimulus intent is whether the federal political process is willing to let go of its own political interests in an effort to maximize the stimulus effect. For example, will Congress waive the requirements that drive up costs and reduce the job creating benefits of infrastructure spending? Will they abandon earmarks alltogether? Not likely, IMHO.

The final argument made for federal funding of infrastructure spending by states is that it is needed to prevent or offset cuts that states will have to make in a weak economy. This argument essentially concedes the points made above, that such spending is really just a safety net for the public sector. It is at best job preserving, not job creating.

Permanent tax cuts offer a much better option. The incoming chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Christina Romer, has estimated that the macroeconomic benefits of tax cuts can be two to three times larger than common estimates of the benefits related to spending increases. The relative advantage of tax cuts over spending is even clearer when the recession is centered on the household balance sheet. Some relatively minor changes, like making the current 15 percent tax rate on dividends and capital gains permanent, would not only help household cash flow, but also put a floor under equity prices much as their introduction did in 2003. This would help protect against further wealth destruction and balance sheet deterioration.

But the centerpiece of any tax cut should be employment taxes: in particular, a permanent halving of the current 12.4 percent Social Security payroll tax on the first $106,800 of wages, split evenly between workers and employers. The direct revenue effect of that would be a bit under $400 billion per year, roughly in line with the present quantitative needs of the economy.

It also meets our three tests of effective stimulus. First, the funds would flow directly to households through higher take-home pay and indirectly through a reduction in the cost of employment. Economic studies conclude that the benefits of a reduction in the employer portion of the payroll tax are ultimately received by employees. But the immediate effect would be an improvement in the cash flow of credit-starved businesses (as well as being a marginal incentive to keep employment up).

Second, the funds would be extremely timely; with the benefits hitting the economy with the first paycheck after the plan was implemented. Third, by lowering the taxation of labor, the plan would help produce a higher-employment recovery than would otherwise be the case.

HT: Larry Lindsey

Trucking firms are downsizing rapidly. More than 130,000 big rigs (over 7%) have been pulled off the road already, and the figure will keep growing as the recession takes a toll. Many trucking firms will be forced out of business entirely and that will generate a huge shortage when the economy recovers. Demand will ramp up faster than capacity, so rates for moving freight will spike. Figure on paying about 10% more when the economic recovery is in full swing. Consider locking in a rate now. Offer to guarantee a minimum level of business in exchange for guaranteed service and limited price hikes.